# Response to reviewers for “Analysis of Information Leakage in Phenotype and Genotype Datasets”

# Response Letter

### -- Ref1: Introduction –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | A. Harmanci and Gerstein demonstrate a three step procedure of how to initiate an attack on group privacy, through the seemingly innocuous use of aggregate datasets - those focusing on the quantification of expression quantitative trait loci (eQTL). At risk from the Harmanci-Gerstein Attack on Individual Privacy is the suspect's  participation in any number of massive studies on obesity, body mass index, cholesterol, or even other hypothetical eQTL datasets that without fail (as shown in figure  1) contain HIV status as a covariate. While Harmanci-Gerstein Attack on Individual Privacy method does not immediately reveal whether the individual being targeted by Harmanci and Gerstein attack is indeed overweight and in need of a dietary intervention - or secretly harboring their high cholesterol numbers from a loved one. As  hypothesized in this article, the fact that they have participated in biomedical research studies funded could lead to any number of negative consequences,  including psychological trauma and taunts from peers for participation in a study published in a low impact journal. Most importantly, the perpetuator of the  Harmanci-Gerstein attack would know that just beyond the dbGap chasm of click-through's, institutional monitoring, progress reports, more progress reports, and IRB's  assuring that dbGap is absolved of privacy breaches' - well lies the suspect's genetic blue print - their individual level data. Harmanci and Gerstein advocate for  changes the ways laws are made as an important step - specifically, adding risks estimates of leakage within future legislative decision making as a first step, which  this paper helps to provide insight into. |
| Author  Response | We thank the reviewer for providing detailed insight into our manuscript. We addressed the reviewer’s comments below. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript |  |

### -- Ref1: The reviewer suspects that the authors are unaware that very similar work was published in 2012 --

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| Reviewer  Comment | The reviewer suspects that the authors are unaware that very similar work was published in 2012 with a fair amount of discussion and attention showing the core  principles of this work on eQTL under what the reviewer considers a more broadly applicable mathematical framework. While the author's focus on using extremes or  outliers as information sources has some unique aspects, the innovative work was in the original work by Im, Cox and colleagues in the American Journal of Human  Genetics. Indeed it was a complete surprise at that time to those who read and went to meetings where this work was presented. I am sure the authors of this paper  are in no doubt aware that Dr. Cox leads one of the largest NIH funded efforts putting forth eQTL data. Thus its reassuring to see that her team prospectively put  for the careful analytical consideration of risk for the community to vet at that time in 2012. |
| Author  Response | We thank the reviewer for pointing us to the Im et al 2012 study, which is an important study relating to Genomic Privacy which we should have cited in our manuscript. We have carefully reviewed the Im et al paper in detail. Interestingly, the reviewer views the scenario that is presented in Im et al study as the only way that the QTLs can be used to breach privacy and views the study as the de-facto standard on the problems of privacy breaches that uses genotype-phenotype correlations as a way to breach privacy. We believe there are major conceptual and technical differences in Im et al study and our study, which we list below.  In the Im et al study, the authors address “detection of a genome in a mixture” in the setting of QTL GWAS studies. It should be noted, however, that we have cited Homer et al 2008 study, which is one of the earlier “detection of a genome in a mixture” studies. In Im et al paper, when the attacker gains access to the allelic dosages (from genotyping arrays or DNA sequencing) at a large number of SNP sites for an individual and the regression coefficients of the SNP genotypes to certain phenotypes, the attacker can statistically identify whether the individual has participated in the original GWAS study or not. The output is a yes/no answer for indicating whether the individual has attended the study or not.  We are, however, studying a different problem with a different setup: We are undertaking the “Linking Attack” problem. In this attack, the attacker aims at characterizing the individuals by linking the genotype and phenotype datasets ***to pinpoint and match the individuals in these datasets***. In our setting, as described in Figure 1 (And new Figure S6), we assume that the attacker gets access to 2 databases where first contains (de-identified) measurements of a large number of phenotypes and second database contains genotypes and individual identities. The attacker aims at linking the first dataset to the second dataset, where the attacker uses one or more of the phenotypes in the first dataset and the phenotype-genotype correlations between the one or more of the phenotypes in the first dataset and the genotypes in second dataset. This way, the attacker can link the rows in the first dataset to the second dataset. Each correct linking of rows in the datasets, links of all the phenotype information (from 1st database) to the identity in the 2nd database, even the ones that were not used in linking.  In this attack, the attacker can either aim at characterizing a specific individual that he is interested in (for example, a sperm donor), in the phenotype (or genotype) dataset or simply try to characterize as many individuals as possible. To quantify the risks associated with both of these scenarios, the accuracy and size estimation is the main focus of our study. Importantly, this scenario has been considered, for example, in Schadt et al 2012 study, in addition to others in privacy literature, which are mainly outside genomic privacy literature. Im et al do not address the issue of “linking”, which is the 3rd step in the individual characterization.  This final point is important for the following reason: Let’s consider that our study is redundant in comparison to Im et al’s study. This would suggest that an attacker could utilize Im et al attack to perform a linking attack. However, if an attacker tried to perform the linking attack as per Im et al study, the input and outputs of the method does not support a linking attack: The attacker could certainly utilize Im et al’s attack to each individual in the genotype dataset using the regression coefficients (assuming there are enough regression coefficients) and determine whether they are in the phenotype dataset or not. After this, however, there is no machinery that is presented in Im et al study to link each individual in genotype dataset to an individual in the phenotype dataset. Therefore, we believe the linking attacks that we are focusing on are out of the scope of Im et al’s study.  As we generate and gather larger and more inclusive genotype-phenotype databases, the linking attacks will become more relevant to privacy in comparison to the detection of a genome in a mixture attacks, as many people will most definitely be in one or more of these databases (One example: In 2014, 4.5 million patient records from 206 hospitals in 29 states were stolen from the databases of the health company named Community Health Systems). Consider following situation, which should clarify the differences even better: An attacker gets access to a genotype dataset of 100,000 individuals and he/she most definitely knows that the individuals in his/her phenotype dataset are already in this genotype dataset; i.e., there is no need to predict participation. The logical question in this scenario that the attacker would ask is: Can I link these people in the phenotype dataset to the people in the genotype dataset? He/she would perform this using our manuscript’s main focus, the linking attack. Im et al attack is not useful to the attacker at all as the participation is already known. Along these lines, a famous linking attack, where the attackers aimed at matching individuals in two different datasets, is the “Netflix Attack”, where sensitive personal information of many individuals1 were identified in a linking attack that linked IMDB and Netflix databases (See following responses for more details). As we generate larger and larger datasets (23andMe recently announced that it genotyped 1 millionth customer2), these datasets will get compromised and be leaked. Before this happens, it is necessary to actively evaluate how effective linking attacks can be performed against the individuals who participated in these datasets so that we can quantify the risks.  An important technical difference between the two approaches is that the statistical test in Im et al 2012 exploits the phenotype to genotype correlations of the specific phenotype and genotype datasets, and not the actual biological correlation (following is from Im et al paper):    On the other hand, in our study, we assume that the attacker utilizes a third party dataset that contains the significant phenotype-genotype correlations, which is utilized for linking. To clarify this, we added new validation experiments where we identify the eQTLs in a one sample set and test the linking accuracy in another sample set and show that the accuracy is still high. In our study, the information leakage happens through this “biological channel” (using genotype predictions via inversion of genotype-to-phenotype correlations), unlike the Im et al study, where the leakage happens through a “statistical channel”, where the set of regression coefficients for the specific QTL study is the main source of leakage.  One other technical difference is that Im et al perform classification of class membership (Participated/Not participated) using a statistical test that uses a statistic defined as following:    This statistic is genotype based, i.e. it uses genotypic information to compute the proposed phenotype statistic (the authors utilize the allelic dosages generated by the DNA genotyping arrays). The authors propose two additional statistics, which are also genotype based. On the other hand, our methodology is based on phenotype information; where we use the phenotypes to first perform genotype prediction, then use the predicted genotypes for linking. The extremity statistic, for example, is based on the phenotypic information. In this sense, two methods use different sources of information and the leakage happens in opposite directions.  Another important technical difference is that the class membership classification in Im et al attack works well (in terms of power, See Section name “Power of the Method” in 2012 paper) when M>>n>>1, where M is the number of SNPs to be used in the classification and n is the number of individuals. Authors use M/n=300 in their experimental validations for each phenotype. Translating this to our test scenario, M/n=300 means, for GEUVADIS dataset where n=421, that one requires ***126,300 expression-genotype regression coefficients for each gene***. From the available files, the largest M for any gene goes upto at most several thousands of regression coefficients, where most of the correlations are against variants that are in linkage disequilibrium (i.e. regression coefficients are not independent), which do not give much information. Moreover, the attacker also needs to ensure M>>n\*>>1; which indicates that the same criteria has to be satisfied with respect to the reference population. Considering the attacker uses 1000 Genomes as reference, i.e., n\*=1092, the required number of regression coefficients are even much higher (It is worth mentioning also that, in the case of simulated dataset experiments, we used n=100,211 in Section 2.4). Although for some eQTL studies all gene to all SNP pairwise correlations are made publicly available, they are, to our knowledge, not available in GEUVADIS project. These issues render the Im et al attack almost non-applicable on the GEUVADIS dataset.  On the contrary, we evaluate our method’s performance using one marker per phenotype, i.e., one gene-one SNP, and using much less number of QTLs in the individual characterization, which highlights the applicability of the linking attack.  We believe that above points clarify our study’s differences from the Im et al study and other “detection of a genome in a mixture” studies, too. We believe this confusion is caused on our part as we may not have clarified well the attack setting. These differences should also be kept in mind for later as they shape and outline the differences in terms of the risk assessment and management that we delve in more detail in the following comments.  We have added a citation to Im et al paper in the background section and made updates to the Introduction and Methods section to ensure that our manuscript is clearer. We have updated Figure 1 to emphasize linking aspect and added Figures S6 and S7 to make linking attack scenario and differences with detection of a genome in a mixture attack scenario clearer. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Background Section: Different aspects of privacy have been intensely studied. Recently, genomic privacy is receiving much attention as a result of the deluge of personalized genomics datasets that are being generated16,17. With the increase in the number of large scale genotyping and phenotyping studies, the protection of privacy of participating individuals emerged as an important issue. Homer et al18 proposed a statistical testing procedure that enables testing whether a genotyped individual is in a pool of samples, for which only the allele frequencies are known. Im et al19 showed that, given the genotypes of a large set of markers for an individual, an attacker can reliably predict whether the individual participated to a QTL study or not. These attacks, which we refer to as “detection of a genome in a mixture”, are one type of attacks on privacy (Fig S6). There is yet another important attack where the attacker links two or more datasets to pinpoint individuals in datasets and reveal sensitive information. One well-known example of these “linking attacks”, although not in a genomic context, is the linking attack that matched the entries in Netflix Prize Database and the Internet Movie Database20. As the size and number of the genotype and phenotype datasets increase, the possibility of linking seemingly different datasets escalates20. When a large number of individuals take part in one or more of these databases, the risks associated with linking attacks will become more significant (Fig S6, Section S2). Supplementary Material Section 2: Comparison of “Detection of a Genome in a Mixture” and “Linking Attacks” in Genomic Privacy Privacy has a multifaceted nature which can be breached under many different scenarios. The methods that assess and manage the risks, however, are scarce and are in need of development. Along this, our study aims at building analysis frameworks that will develop “measurable method for addressing privacy risk in information systems” (<http://www.nist.gov/itl/201506_privacy_framework.cfm>). In genomic privacy, the initial focus is to protect the identities of the individuals who attend genetic databases. The initial studies on privacy, therefore, focused on the statistical methods to predict whether a certain individual with known genotypes attended a study or not. We refer to this scenario as “detection of a genome in a mixture”. These are illustrated in Fig S6b. The attacker gets access to a genotype dataset (green). The attacker acquires also the statistics for the study in which he/she is to evaluate the participation of the individuals. The statistics can be simply the regression coefficients in a QTL study6, or the allele frequencies7 in a large scale genotyping study. He/she also needs a reference population on which the allele frequencies are known. These datasets are fed into a statistical testing procedure to decide whether the individuals in the genotype dataset have attended the study or not. Among all the scenarios, these attacks will breach privacy when an individual would like to hide their participation in a study. Although this holds true for many of the datasets, it is not relevant when the individual’s participation is almost certainly true or known. For example, if DNA genotyping becomes a routine operation in hospitals in near future, it will be most likely that an individual has participated in the genotyping dataset in their hospital of choice. The privacy concern will then be whether an attacker can pinpoint the individual among all other people within the large genotype database. The linking attacks become much more relevant at this point: If the attacker gets access to the genotype database, and can link it to another database with this individual’s phenotypes, he/she can reveal sensitive information (like disease status, address, sensitive phenotypes) by the linked entries in the databases. |

### -- Ref1: The review views the incremental advancements over the 2012 paper do not support the far-reaching conclusions that the work by Harmanci and Gerstein for changing legistlative decision making process in a way that the Im et al paper did not.

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| Reviewer  Comment | Again, a major aspect of this 2012 work was indeed privacy risk via eQTL, and indeed at that time it was a major shock to myself and other colleagues how powerful  eQTL data really can be. In comparison of the two papers, the 2012 seems focused on a broader problem building from eQTL in line with Nature Methods as premier  journal to publish methodological firsts. The review views the incremental advancements over the 2012 paper do not support the far-reaching conclusions that the  work by Harmanci and Gerstein for changing legistlative decision making process in a way that the Im et al paper did not. I remain more impressed to see how Cox  and colleagues in 2012 provider a broader framework and a bit stunned that p-values and odds ratios from enough SNPs limit absolute privacy. This generalizable  framework intuitively makes sense - when asking one question about a person's membership in a cohort can we use thousands and thousands of correlated measurements  to infer correctly the answer. The privacy risk management issue covered elsewhere then is towards what is the probability of this impacting a specific person's  privacy. |
| Author  Response | The reviewer finds our study’s contributions not very impressive compared to Im et al study. As we outlined above, our study addresses a different aspect of genomic privacy compared to Im et al study.  Our study’s main aim is to first bring into public view the potential risks behind releasing seemingly unrelated phenotyping and genotyping datasets. The linking attacks underpin these risks. We concentrate on quantification of the leakage in these attacks and show how extremity based genotype prediction can be utilized to perform an effective linking attack. Extremity is a fairly central theme in privacy analysis: Any time an individual is outlier in any feature, they can be distinguished easily from other individuals. Although fairly simple to implement, our results demonstrate the usage of extremity in the context of genotype prediction and linking attacks. In this sense, our results point to how easy it may be to accurately link individuals in phenotype datasets to those in genotype datasets with very small amount of information, which we think is a result at least as striking as the Im et al study.  The reviewer puts forward Im et al and the “detection of genome in a mixture” as a meaningful and generalizable framework. We believe, for the reasons we explained above, the Im et al attacks (and “detection of a genome in a mixture” attacks) are not applicable to the scenario that we are presenting.  [[3 step framework, extremity based attack’s generalized modeling]]  Although we agree with the reviewer that a meaningful risk management should be defined in studies on privacy, we believe that the Linking Attacks should be analyzed through a different risk management procedure than the detection attacks. In the detection in a mixture attacks, the risk stems from detectability of participation of an individual within a cohort. As we discussed in the previous responses, this is inherently a different scenario (both conceptually and technically) than the linking attack scenario. In a linking attack, the risks stem from the fact that an individual in a phenotype dataset can be pinpointed, using the predictable genotypes as quasi-identifiers, within a genotype dataset. Using the linkage, the adversary can link the information in other datasets to this dataset. The risks, as we presented in Sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, are quantified in terms of linkability of the individuals, i.e., accuracy of linking and characterizing information leakage.  In regards to Reviewer’s comments on changing legislative decision making process: It is widely accepted that the risk assessment and management methods are scarce and are in need of development. In parallel with the recently recognized needs to develop and build “measurable method for addressing privacy risk in information systems” (<http://www.nist.gov/itl/201506_privacy_framework.cfm>), our aim is to build analysis frameworks for the specific case of linking attacks. These frameworks help objectively quantify the risks associated with genotype-phenotype data publishing/serving. The suggestions in our study (and many others before our study) should be used more extensively while data sharing mechanisms are designed. For this, we also made our tools available.  We have added a section on discussion about risk management and analysis in the Supplementary Material that combines all the analysis that we presented throughout our manuscript. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Supplementary Material Section 2: Comparison of “Detection of a Genome in a Mixture” and “Linking Attacks” in Genomic Privacy Privacy has a multifaceted nature which can be breached under many different scenarios. The methods that assess and manage the risks, however, are scarce and are in need of development. Along this, our study aims at building analysis frameworks that will develop “measurable method for addressing privacy risk in information systems” (<http://www.nist.gov/itl/201506_privacy_framework.cfm>).  …  These also point to the differences in the risks incurred by linking attacks and “detection of a genome in a mixture attack” and how these risks should be managed in different contexts. The main risk in detection attacks is founded on the detectability of participation of an individual in a dataset. Since the risks are incurred by the same datasets, they can be managed by evaluating which individuals can be targeted to detection attacks and restricting access to these individuals’ genotype and phenotype data. In linking attacks, the risks are founded on the linkability of an individual in a phenotype dataset to other datasets. Specifically, the risks are based on the fact that the linked datasets reveal sensitive information about the individual. The fact that these datasets are independently published/served will grossly complicate the risk management for linking attacks. The most secure risk management is restricting access to the genotype and phenotype datasets, or the QTL datasets. Another risk management strategy that can be useful data publishing is k-anonymization utilizing data perturbation techniques1. In these techniques, the phenotype data is anonymized in a way such that no combination of quasi-identifiers (i.e., predicted genotypes) are shared among less than *k* individuals. This is ensured by different techniques such as data censoring or noise addition. *k* can be chosen as a tradeoff between utility versus the risk of a privacy breach. Higher *k* implies a stronger anonymization of the data at the expense of lower utility of the data. Supplemantary Material Section 5: A Basic Risk Assessment Procedure for Genotype-Phenotype Datasets Figure S8 illustrates a risk assessment procedure that puts together different parts of our study. The analysis of tradeoff between ICI leakage and predictability (Section 2.2, top path in Fig S8) can be utilized for evaluating the risks associated with releasing QTL datasets. For a newly identified set of QTLs, the data releasers can compute the average information leakage and the corresponding levels of predictability to estimate the number of individuals that are potentially vulnerable at different levels of predictability. The predictabilities can be estimated using the conditional entropies in the QTL detection datasets, and the ICI leakage can be estimated using the genotype frequencies from the population panels. Secondly, the risks associated with releasing matching genotype and phenotype datasets can be evaluated using the 3-step linking attack frameworks. For this, the vulnerable individuals are identified. Finally a risk assessment can be performed to ensure that the vulnerable individuals are protected. |

### -- Ref1: the paper doesn't consider a hallmark of risk management of also considering the probability of a 'meaningful' privacy breach –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | This brings the second major critique of the paper, that the paper doesn't consider a hallmark of risk management of also considering the probability of a 'meaningful'  privacy breach to an individual and damages incurred under proper analysis of risk management. The paper brings up the legislature goals, and thus that lack of  utilization of standard approaches for managing and quantifying risk management is a fair area of critique and a deficiency. Of course, a major premise of legislative  privacy is the impact or damage to an individual by a privacy breach. The question can be framed: "What is the probability that a person with information they wished  to remain protected from other individuals is compromised, and what is the tort damages if so? " The authors frame privacy risk through an anecdotal example that seems  unfounded in individual privacy - in contrary to the example the authors used, privacy risk is not only about speculating that a person exists who wants to expose as  many people as possible, as is hypothesized in this paper. Pragmatically, it's more probable that a person would search for a specific person, such as a child of a  sperm-donor father. |
| Author  Response | We understand that the reviewer finds our scenario anecdotal and unrealistic. We agree that the attack scenarios should provide a reasonable argument showing a real risk on individual privacy. We, however, do not agree with the reviewer’s view that our scenario, privacy breach via linking attacks, is not well-founded in individual privacy. Firstly, Schadt et al’s 2012 study (Cited in the Background Section) takes on the linking attacks in a scenario that is practically the same as ours.  Apart from this, linking attacks have a very rich literature in the field of privacy research. One very well-known example is Latanya Sweeney’s8 demonstration of a linking which characterized the governor of Massachusetts, in addition to many other individuals, by linking the voter registration list to the Group Insurance Commission’s publicly released de-identified records using shared columns in these databases. Latanya Sweeney also demonstrated that the identities of several personal genome project (PGP) participants can be re-identified by linking the PGP database to the voters list in a similar fashion as above9.  In addition, another well-known example was the demonstration of the linking attack on the Netflix records and Internet Movie Database records (IMDB). Netflix was sued by many people over the privacy concerns that stem from the linking attack performed by Narayanan et al1 who linked the IMDB records and Netflix Prize competition database (seemingly unrelated databases of a very large number of individuals) to reveal identities of Netflix users, in addition to sensitive information about them. The story can be found here:  <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netflix_Prize#Privacy_concerns>  To relate this further to our study; any movie enjoying person can be expected to be in one of these datasets, which renders the prediction of participation problem (Im et al study) somewhat useless. Actually, Netflix is enormously popular and includes millions of individuals in their databases. There is a very good chance that any person in a group of intellectual individuals that we randomly pick will be in one of these databases. The question that an attacker would be asking is: Can I characterize these people are and reveal what their preferences are?  In addition, the literature on linking attacks (and on any privacy aware data publishing/serving mechanism, for that matter) consider any type of sensitive information leakage will lead to a privacy breach and must be protected. Formalisms that try to limit the leakage are: k-anonymization and differential privacy, l-diversity, t-closeness, etc. Following this, we would like to argue that the risk management (via anonymization) that these formalisms provide do not conform with the reviewer’s view of a reasonable risk of privacy breach. In these studies, for example k-anonymization, any individual that can be characterized/identified is considered a serious risk, and thus must be protected, without regard to whether they would like to be protected. A dataset is k-anonymous when all the individuals that satisfy k-anonymity condition, not just a selected set of individuals. In other words, characterization of even one individual is as serious a risk as characterization of many (any person who is not a sperm donor still has the right to stay private). A more concrete example for this is, the homogeneity based linking attack10, which underpins the motivation for l-diversity based data anonymization, targets a rather small fraction of individuals in a given dataset, yet no one argues about the reality or validity of the privacy concerns it creates.  In our study, we are showing that the linking attacks can target and characterize a large fraction of the individuals (supported by the PPV analysis), which indicates that the linking attack has realistic levels of associated risk and can target an individual with high probability.  We have added a discussion in the Supplementary Material that summarizes the above points and also updated to manuscript to incorporate the changes. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Supplemantary Material Section 2: Comparison of “Detection of a Genome in a Mixture” and “Linking Attacks” in Genomic Privacy One famous example of these attacks (although not in a genomic context) is Latanya Sweeney’s8 demonstration of a linking which characterized the governor of Massachusetts, in addition to many other individuals, by linking the voter registration list to the Group Insurance Commission’s publicly released de-identified records using shared common columns in these databases. Sweeney also demonstrated that the identities of several personal genome project (PGP) participants can be re-identified by linking the PGP database to the voters list in a similar fashion as above9. Another well-known example was the demonstration of the linking attack on the Netflix and Internet Movie Database Records (IMDB). Netflix was sued by many people over the privacy concerns that stem from the linking attack demonstrated by Narayanan et al1 who linked the IMDB records and Netflix Prize competition database (seemingly unrelated databases of a very large number of individuals) to reveal identities of Netflix users, in addition to sensitive information about them. As it can be seen, the genomic linking attacks are almost orthogonal (or independent) to the detection of a genome in a mixture attacks since the attacker most certainly knows that the individuals at hand are in the genotype dataset that he/she is trying to link to.    These also point to the differences in the risks incurred by linking attacks and “detection of a genome in a mixture attack” and how these risks should be managed in different contexts. The main risk in detection attacks is founded on the detectability of participation of an individual in a dataset. Since the risks are incurred by the same datasets, they can be managed by evaluating which individuals can be targeted to detection attacks and restricting access to these individuals’ genotype and phenotype data. In linking attacks, the risks are founded on the linkability of an individual in a phenotype dataset to other datasets. Specifically, the risks are based on the fact that the linked datasets reveal sensitive information about the individual. The fact that these datasets are independently published/served will grossly complicate the risk management for linking attacks. The most secure risk management is restricting access to the genotype and phenotype datasets, or the QTL datasets. Another risk management strategy that can be useful data publishing is k-anonymization utilizing data perturbation techniques1. In these techniques, the phenotype data is anonymized in a way such that no combination of quasi-identifiers (i.e., predicted genotypes) are shared among less than *k* individuals. This is ensured by different techniques such as data censoring or noise addition. *k* can be chosen as a tradeoff between utility versus the risk of a privacy breach. Higher *k* implies a stronger anonymization of the data at the expense of lower utility of the data. |

### -- Ref1: Thus the reviewer provides a specific suggestion that is to frame improvements of their methods in comparison to the proposed methods as either PPV or AUC. – --

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| Reviewer  Comment | As such, and as has been generally modeled in other frameworks, the focus should be on positive predictive value. Given a person is trying to keep information private that would be damaging ( legislative tort is framed in damages both punitive and otherwise as such as HiV stat), what is the probability that a person would correctly identify something about their privacy. Thus this metric considers - well most people don't participate in studies and that too many false positives makes an approach unreliable at detecting a rare event. It also reflects that a privacy breach for a random person visually obese would not be meaningful for many people who have pride in participating in a biomedical study. Thus the reviewer provides a specific suggestion that is to frame improvements of their methods in comparison to the proposed methods as either PPV or AUC, given the overall prevalence of people participating in eQTL databases that could expose potentially damaging information. The review  concern is that they rare 'outlier information' would lower the prevalence and thus not increase diagnostic accuracy. |
| Author  Response | We understand that the reviewer’s suggestion about comparison of our proposed method in terms of positive predictive value.  We have made two changes to the manuscript to address these concerns. First, in order evaluate the risks that are incurred by the extremity based attack, we evaluated the positive predictive value of the linkings. For this, we propose the *first distance gap*, , which the attacker can compute for each linking to estimate reliabilities of the linkings. The attacker can use this measure to sort the linkings and evaluate whether to use the linkings or not. We have included sensitivity versus PPV plots (Figs 5, 6) for the different linking scenarios. It can be seen that when the attacker utilizes this measure, among all the test scenarios, more than 50% of the linkings (sensitivity) can be performed with PPV greater than 95%. In some cases the sensitivity goes up to 80% or more while PPV is greater than 95%. These results show that our method does not link only the obvious outlier individuals but a much larger fraction.  Among the methods that are mentioned, the most relevant to our method is Schadt et al 2012’s methodology, which performs a linking attack using a supervised model training for genotype prediction. This method takes as input a training and testing dataset, trains the genotype prediction model, then identifies the best linking for each individual in the testing set. It does not compute PPV of the linkings so we compared the linking accuracies of our method and Schadt et al method. In order to compare the linking accuracies of the two methods, we first divided the samples into 3 sets, where first set is used for training Schadt et al method, second set is used to discover eQTLs and third set is used to test the linking accuracies. We identified the eQTLs and selected the top 1000 eQTLs to be used in linking. We then performed linking using each method. The results can be seen in Table S2, which show that both methods perform very similarly and identify very high fraction of individuals. These show that the extremity based linking can characterize individuals very similarly in terms of linking accuracy as the approach proposed by Schadt.  It should be noted that Schadt et al’s method requires, in addition to the list of eQTLs, a training dataset to build a model for genotype prediction, while our method requires only the list of eQTLs to be used in linking. In order to make a comparison of accuracy versus input size, we evaluated how the accuracy of Schadt et al method changes with changing training data size. For this, we evaluated the linking accuracy of Schadt et al with changing training data size. The results are tabulated in Table S2. These show that the accuracy of Schadt et al’s method decreases as the training data size decreases and requires at least 30 data points (15 expression and genotype values) per eQTL to train the model robustly and accurately. Thus, our method requires roughly 30 times less data (only 1 parameter per eQTL is necessary), which illustrates the difference in terms of the required input size to each method. This also reflects the applicability of each method by an attacker: Extremity based linking requires much less information and thus is much easier to implement compared to Schadt et al’s methodology.  In simpler terms, our method can bring a very high and comparable linking accuracy as the Schadt et al’s method, while requiring much less input information.  We also want to emphasize that the results of a comparison of privacy breaching methods should be treated with caution. Our aim is to evaluate whether using extremity based genotype prediction approach decreases the linking accuracy of the attacker significantly compared to the attack by Schadt et al. Since all the attacks represent a different routes to a privacy breach, the data publishing/sharing mechanisms must consider and protect against all of these attacks, rather than considering just the “best” one. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Section 4.6: First Distance Gap Statistic For Reliability Estimation of Each Linking Following the previous section, the attacker computes, for each individual, the distance to all the genotypes in genotype dataset, then identifies the individual with smallest distance. Let and denote the minimum and second minimum genotype distances (among for all ***a***) for individual. We propose using the difference between these distances as a measure of reliability of linking. For this, the attacker computes following difference:   |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | |  |  | (23) |   First distance gap can be computed without the knowledge of the true genotypes, and is immediately accessible by the attacker with no need for auxiliary information. The basic motivation for this statistic comes from the observation that the first distance gap for correctly linked individuals are much higher compared to the incorrectly linked individuals (See Figure S5). Section 2.4: Individual Characterization using Extremity based Genotype Prediction We evaluated whether the attacker can estimate the reliability of the linkings. This may potentially increase the effectiveness of the linking and increase the risk associated with linking attacks because the attacker can estimate reliability of the linkings and choose the ones that are more likely to be correct. This increases the risk associated with the linking attacks because although he/she may not have a high overall accuracy of linkings, the high ranking linkings may be much higher in accuracy. We observed that the measure we termed, *first distance gap*, denoted by (See Methods Section 4.6), serves as a good reliability estimate for each linking. For a given linking, is the difference between the genotype distances of the 1st closest and 2nd closest individuals to the predicted genotypes. When the linking is incorrect, we observed that is very likely to be smaller than the distance difference when the linking is correct.  To evaluate this measure further, we computed the positive predictive value (PPV) versus sensitivity of the linkings of individuals in the testing set with changing threshold. For this, we first computed for each linking, then filtered the linkings that did not satisfy the threshold. Then we computed PPV and sensitivity of the linkings (See Methods Section 4.9), which is plotted in Fig 6b. It can be seen that the PPV of linkings can get very high at the same time with high sensitivity. For example, the attacker can link around 79% of the individuals at a PPV higher than 95%. The random sorting of the linkings, on the other hand, have significantly lower PPV (cyan in the plots) at the same sensitivity levels. These results suggest that the attacker can increase the potential risk (accuracy of linkings) of the attack by focusing on a slightly smaller set of linkings with high reliability. Supplementary Material Section 3: Comparison of Extremity based Linking Attack Accuracy with Linking Attack in Schadt et al It is worth comparing the accuracies of extremity attack and the attack proposed in Schadt et al11. This attack takes as input a training set comprising the expression and genotype dataset and the list of eQTLs. Using the training set and eQTLs, it trains a genotype prediction model, which is then used for in the linking attack. On the other hand, extremity attack takes only the list of eQTLs. In order to compare the linking accuracies, we first divided the GEUVADIS dataset into 3 sets: First set is used for identifying eQTLs (85 individuals). Second set is used for training Schadt et al method (85 individuals) and the final set is used (174 individuals) for performing the linking attack and comparing the accuracies. We utilized the 1000 top eQTLs identified on the training dataset, as used in Schadt et al study11. Extremity based linking takes as input the eQTLs and the testing expression dataset. Schadt et al method takes as input the training set (expression and genotypes) and the testing expression dataset. The linking accuracies are shown in Table S2. It can be seen that both methods perform with very high accuracy. These results show that our approach performs comparably at high accuracy as the approach proposed by Schadt et al.  As the amount of data that is required is not the same while testing two methods, we also compared the amount of input that each method requires to gain the reported linking accuracies. Our method takes, for each eQTL only 1 parameter, which is the correlation coefficient. Schadt et al method, on the other hand, takes as input a training dataset (expressions and genotypes) to build the prediction model. We changed the training data size and evaluated the linking accuracy (Results in Table S2). It can be seen when the training data size is at 30 data points per eQTL, the accuracy of Schadt et al is almost comparable to extremity based attack. This result illustrates the difference in the required data size for both methods. Extremity attack requires 20 to 30 times less data compared to Schadt et al method, which highlight the practical applicability of the extremity attack on a dataset. |

### -- Ref1: the reviewer profusely thanks the authors for putting forth a paper that breaks the monotony of boring and dry introductions/discussions –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | Finally, the reviewer profusely thanks the authors for putting forth a paper that breaks the monotony of boring and dry introductions/discussions, for one that  confidently suggests the legislature should carefully utilize this framework for their deliberation to protect our privacy. Enjoying both the tone of the discussion  and introduction, I was only disappointed to see no references to the NSA, Edward Snow, or Jennifer Lawrence woven into sections on privacy breaches. The reviewer  suspects the authors were unaware of prior similar work and similarly appreciates a periodically 'tongue and cheek' and playful review critique. |
| Author  Response | We thank the reviewer for constructive suggestions, which we believe made our manuscript much more complete. After consideration, we did not find the suggested individuals to be sufficiently related to biomedical data privacy. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript |  |

### -- Ref2: Introduction –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | In this article, Harmanci and Gerstein investigated an intriguing question regarding genomic privacy: given a person 's phenotype (specifically eQTL), whether an  intruder can stake advantages of known genotype-phenotype correlations existing in the public domain and reversely predict the genotype of the person. The authors  showed that ...  As stated by the authors, this work can be considered as an extension of an earlier work by Schadt and colleagues (Nat Gen 2012), in which they showed that given a  set of high-quality mRNA expression data of a given tissue for a human cohort (and SNPs) as training data, one can predict the genotypes of another independent cohort  with high accuracy. One of the major innovations of this work in comparison with the earlier work is that they showed that, inclusion of additional phenotypic data  (gender and ethnicity) gives the intruder more power in predicting genotypes. The second breakthrough of this work is that, instead of using Bayesian probabilistic  approach, the authors showed that the potential privacy intruder can use the extreme outliers existed in the phenotypic data as a guidance to identify the  corresponding individual. |
| Author  Response | We thank the reviewer for constructive assessment of our manuscript. We address the comments below. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript |  |

### -- Ref2: I think the work itself is interesting, however the presentation can be further clarified in places. –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | I think the work itself is interesting, however the presentation can be further clarified in places. For starters, the equations in the manuscript need to be numbered so that it helps the readers (and reviewers) to reference the mathematical work (there are no page numbers either). The foundation of the "extremity" is described in  Section 2.4, I am a little surprised that the authors did not provide any reference in this part, has the concept of Extreme Statistic not ever described in other  field? I would like to see more elaboration and motivation on this part. Is the "extremity statistic" just a transformation of rank correlation? Also please clarify  why genotype value 1 is never assigned to 1. |
| Author  Response | We agree with the reviewer’s rightful concern that the mathematical work should be clearly labeled, which may otherwise make it harder to follow. We added numbers to all the equations and also added page numbers. These should make it much easier to follow and refer to the mathematical work in the manuscript.  Extremity statistic is very much related to normalized rank, which we referred to in the manuscript. The genotype prediction by extremity statistic utilizes the fact that the extremes of gene expression levels associate with the extremes of the genotypes, i.e., homozygous genotypes. The attacker uses this to build a simplified estimate of the posterior distribution of genotypes given expression levels and utilizes this for genotype prediction (Method Section 4.8). The genotype prediction for each SNP (given the expression levels) can also be conceptually interpreted as performing a rank correlation between the homozygous genotypes and the gene expression levels and selecting the genotypes that maximize the correlation.  We understand that the reviewer finds extremity based genotype prediction not well motivated. In fact, using extreme phenotypes of an individual is a general route to a privacy breach. This is because, any outlier phenotype of a person is an identifying feature that can be used by an attacker to characterize/identify the person. In our study, we focus on the extremities of phenotypes to infer genotypes then link to the genotype datasets. The extremity based prediction exploits the outliers; i.e, the outliers in the expression levels are associated with the outliers in the genotypes, i.e., the homozygous genotypes. Finally, to address reviewer’s last question: The heterozygous genotypes, do not co-incide with the extremes of the expression levels, i.e., they co-incide with the medium expression levels. Thus, we do not assign the heterozygous genotype in the genotype prediction. Finally, in the linking step, we utilize only the homozygous genotypes in the matching, since we predict only those.  Alternatively, the extremity based genotype prediction can be interpreted as a prediction method that uses a simplified model to represent the joint genotype-phenotype distribution (Methods Section 4.8). We then use the joint distribution to generate the posterior probabilities of genotypes presented in Equation (4-6), which are then used in genotype prediction. We believe this connects conceptually the MAP prediction based attacks and extremity based attacks and makes the motivation of extremity attack clearer and more concrete.  We clarified the explanation of genotype prediction by extremity attack in the Results Section and also added a section in Supplementary data including extended discussion. We updated the Section 2.4. We also added Figure S9 and Methods Section 4.8 that discusses different simplifications of the genotype prediction models and connects them to extremity based attack. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Section 2.4: Individual Characterization using Extremity based Genotype Prediction Extremity can be interpreted as a normalized rank, which is bounded between -0.5 and 0.5. Figure S4a shows the median absolute extremity distribution of all the gene expression levels among the individuals. The average median extremity is uniformly distributed among individuals. Figure S4b shows the median number of genes with minimum extremity. Almost half of the genes in each individual have higher than 0.3 extremity in the population. Also, around 1000 genes have higher than 0.45 absolute extremity. In other words, each individual harbors substantial number of genes whose expressions are at the extremes within the population. These can potentially serve as quasi-identifiers. It is worth noting, however, that not all of these extreme genes are associated with eQTLs.  …  As yet another way of interpretation, the genotype prediction can be interpreted as a rank correlation between the genotypes and expression levels and choosing the homozygous genotypes that maximize the absolute values of the rank correlation. Thus, this process can be generalized as a rank correlation based prediction. Section 4.8: On Modeling of Genotype-Phenotype Distribution for Genotype Prediction in Linking Attacks In the second step of the linking attack, the genotype predictions are performed. The genotype predictions are used, as an intermediate information, as input to the step 3 in Fig 3, where linking is performed. The main aim of attacker is to maximize the linking accuracy (not the genotype prediction accuracy), which depends jointly on the genotype prediction accuracy and the accuracy of the genotype matching in the 3rd step. Other than the accuracy of linking, another important consideration, for risk management purposes, is the amount of auxiliary input data (like training data for prediction model) that the genotype prediction takes. The prediction methods that require high amount of auxiliary data would decrease the applicability of the linking attack as the attacker would need to gather extra information before performing the attack. On the other hand, the prediction methods that require little or no auxiliary data makes the linking attack much more realistic and prevalent. It is therefore useful, in the risk management strategies, to study complexities of genotype prediction methods and evaluate how these translate into assessing the accuracy and applicability of the linking attack. We study different simplifications of genotype prediction, and illustrate different levels of complexity for genotype prediction.  As we presented in Section 2.3, we assume that the attacker estimates the posterior distribution of genotypes and utilizes the maximum *a posteriori* estimate of the genotype as the general prediction method. For this, attacker must first model the joint genotype-phenotype distribution and then build the posterior genotype distribution. Figure S9a shows the joint genotype-expression distribution for an eQTL. Figure S9b shows the modeling of the joint distribution using 3 conditional distributions of expression levels at each genotype. First, the means and variances of the distributions are assumed independent. Assuming that mean and variance are sufficient statistics for the conditional distributions (e.g., normally distributed), the joint distributions can be modeled when the 6 parameters (3 means and 3 variances) are trained. The training can be performed using unsupervised methods like expectation maximization or can be performed using training data. This would, however, increase the required auxiliary data and decrease the applicability of the linking attack. Figure S9c shows a simplification of the model by assuming the variances of the conditional expression distributions are same for each genotype. This decreases the number of parameters to be trained to 4 (3 means and 1 variance). Figure S9d shows an equally complex model with 4 parameters where the conditional distributions are uniform at non-overlapping ranges of expression for each genotype. This model requires 4 parameters to be trained corresponding to the expression range limits. Figure S9e shows the final simplification of the genotype prediction, which requires only one parameter to be trained. In this model, the prediction only assigns uniform probability for homozygous genotypes when expression levels higher or lower than and assigns 0 conditional probability to the heterozygous genotypes, which brings up an important point: This simplified model is exactly the distribution that is utilized in the extremity based genotype prediction. In the extremity based prediction, we estimate simply as the mid-point of the range of gene expression levels within the expression dataset (Equations 3 and 4-6). Supplementary Section 1: Motivation on Extremity Attack: Outlier Attacks in Privacy Extremity is a central concept in privacy. This is because the individuals who are outliers in certain characteristics are statistically more distinguishable than other samples, which makes them more prone to be targeted by the privacy breaching attacks. A simple example follows: “If a person is driving a very expensive vehicle, it can be deduced with high certainty that he/she is wealthy”. It is worth noting that the reverse is not always true; i.e., a wealthy person can also drive a mid-range priced vehicle. Thus the extremity of the vehicle price enables us to estimate very roughly the economical status of a person. In formalisms like k-anonymization8, the aim is to protect published datasets by imposing statistical indistinguishability of the rare and extreme features using different methods like censoring, swapping, adding noise. In our study, the attacker uses extremity to evaluate the outlierness of the individuals’ phenotypes, then he/she predicts the genotypes and then distinguish them from other individuals. Since the extremity is simple to estimate from the data, the extremity based attack can be implemented easily, which makes it fairly applicable and realistic in most situations.  In our study, we focus on the extremities of phenotypes, expression levels, to infer genotypes then link to the genotype datasets. The extremity based prediction exploits the outliers; i.e, the outliers in the expression levels are associated with the outliers in the genotypes, i.e., the homozygous genotypes. The heterozygous genotypes, do not co-incide with the extremes of the expression levels, i.e., they co-incide with the medium expression levels. Thus, we do not assign the heterozygous genotype in the genotype prediction. Although predicting only homozygous genotypes decreases the genotype prediction accuracy, the main goal is linking the individuals correctly. Thus, in the linking step, we utilize only the homozygous genotypes to compute the distances and perform matching. |

### -- Ref2: some concrete examples would be very helpful to demonstrate the power of the approach described by the authors –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | Also, I think some concrete examples would be very helpful to demonstrate the power of the approach described by the authors, i.e. identities of individuals that  would not have been discovered if only gene expression data was used or if extremity approach was not used. |
| Author  Response | We added Figure S6 to illustrate a specific example of the linking attack by the extremity based genotype prediction. The example first illustrates the specific details of the extremity based linking attack by showing how the extremities translate to the predicted genotypes. It also shows how the extremities in gene expression levels can help the attacker can distinguish between two individuals, while the third individual does not get resolved correctly because there are not enough extreme identifiers to pinpoint that individual. We believe this figure helps illustrate better the idea that phenotypic extremity can lead to privacy breaches in linking attacks. We also added references to the figure in the main text and Supplementary Material. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Supplementary Material Section 6: An Example of Linking by Phenotype Extremity Figure S7 shows an example of a linking attack that utilizes phenotype extremity. The basic idea is to use the extreme phenotypes (the gene expression levels) to estimate the genotypes then match them to the genotype dataset and reveal the disease status. In the example, we are focusing on 3 individuals; Bob, Alice, and John in the genotype dataset. The attacker makes use of 6 genes and variants in this attack. The gene expression levels are represented in terms of their extremity levels and some are shown as not extreme for illustrative purposes. The extreme ones are used in genotype prediction using the eQTL dataset for 6 genes. Given the predicted genotypes (note that some are predicted wrongly), Bob and John are correctly linked to their entries in the expression dataset and their disease status are revealed as positive. In this prediction, the 3 out of 4 predicted genotypes are the same for Bob and John (rs6052708, rs12479581, rs6077023). The 4th predicted genotype (rs7274244) enables pinpointing the exact entries for Bob and John. For Alice, however, there are two entries that are equally matching to the correctly predicted genotypes. The attacker, thus, cannot characterize the disease status for Alice. |

### -- Ref3: Introduction –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | Genomic privacy is an increasingly important direction of research. One of the aspects of work on genomic privacy has focused on ways to breach privacy by linking  different kinds of data. This paper presents an attack that can be used to link a phenotype (in their specific case, gene expression) to a genotype and possibly to  other identifying information. The study presents simulations to show the feasibility of this attack.  The authors consider the following setup: an attacker has access to an individual genotype (this could be part of a larger dataset), a dataset of individual-level  gene expression (but no genotypes) and a list of variants that are known to affect expression of specific genes. The attack consists of predicting the genotypes at  the list of expression SNPs corresponding to the the gene expression data and then testing if the target individual genotype matches any of the predicted genotypes.  They consider two variants. In the first (2.3), the attacker needs a prediction model to predict genotypes from expression. This, in turn, implies that the attacker  would need access to data where individuals have genotypes as well as gene expression. In the second (2.4), termed Extremity-based genotype prediction, the attacker  only has access to the correlation between genotype and gene expression. The authors show that for both variants, a large fraction of individuals (>=95%) are  vulnerable as assessed by simulation experiments on the GEUVADIS dataset. |
| Author  Response | We thank the reviewer for careful |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript |  |

### -- Ref3: The authors need to do a better job of clarifying their contribution and motivating the reason why variant 2 is realistic. –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | 1. Variant 1 of the attack is very similar to the attack described in Schadt et al. (Nature Genetics 2012) which the authors cite. The only difference is that here the  authors explore the number of eQTLs to use while Schadt uses 1000 top cis eQTLs. Variant 2 is novel as it relaxes the requirement that the attacker has access to joint  genotype-gene expression data to learn the prediction model. The authors need to do a better job of clarifying their contribution and motivating the reason why  variant 2 is realistic. |
| Author  Response | We agree that we may have not clearly stated our contributions. We are listing them below for clarification:  In Section 2.2, we are proposing quantification metrics that measure the tradeoff between predictability of the genotypes and the information leakage in the predicted genotypes. These metrics that we proposed can be utilized for evaluating the extent of leakage and the corresponding risk (predictability) of individual characterization while new phenotype-genotype correlation datasets are being released.  Attack Variant 1 (Section 2.3) is a generalized analysis of the linking attack, where the attacker knows perfectly the joint expression-genotype distribution. Although this seems similar to Schadt et al study, we utilize a non-parametric histogram based model for genotype prediction. In Schadt et al, the authors utilize a Gaussian approximation for genotype predictions. This enables a more generalized analysis of the linking attacks in the 3-step analysis framework that we proposed.  Attack Variant 2 (Section 2.4) is the extremity attack. This attack is an instantiation of the 3-step decomposition, and also illustration of that a simplified approach can reach very high linking accuracy. As explained by the reviewer, we are investigating whether the attacker can just use a measure of “outlierness” in the gene expression levels for genotype prediction. We then evaluate under different situations the viability of this novel attack.  We understand that the motivation for extremity attack may not be well-stated in our manuscript. Extremity is a fairly central concept in privacy. This is because the individuals who are outliers in certain characteristics are statistically more distinguishable than other samples, which makes them more prone to be targeted by the privacy breaching attacks. For example, in k-anonymization, one aims to protect published datasets by imposing statistical indistinguishability of the rare and extreme features using different methods (e.g. censoring, swapping data, adding noise). In our study, the attacker uses extremity to evaluate the outlierness of the individuals’ phenotypes, predicting genotypes, and distinguishing them from other individuals. Since the extremity is simple to estimate from the data, which can be combined with the proposed genotype estimation procedure, the extremity based attack can be implemented easily. This makes it fairly applicable and realistic in most situations.  We added a motivation for the extremity attack in the Supplemantary Material Section 1. In order to motivate the extremity based attack and connect Section 2.4 to previous sections, we also added Section 4.8, where we discuss that the extremity based prediction utilizes a simplified model for building an estimate of the joint genotype-expression distribution and builds the posterior distribution of genotypes based on this distribution. Figure S9 is added to illustrate the relation between different approaches for estimating the joint expression-genotype distribution. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Section 2.4: Individual Characterization using Extremity based Genotype Prediction Extremity can be interpreted as a normalized rank, which is bounded between -0.5 and 0.5. Figure S4a shows the median absolute extremity distribution of all the gene expression levels among the individuals. The average median extremity is uniformly distributed among individuals. Figure S4b shows the median number of genes with minimum extremity. Almost half of the genes in each individual have higher than 0.3 extremity in the population. Also, around 1000 genes have higher than 0.45 absolute extremity. In other words, each individual harbors substantial number of genes whose expressions are at the extremes within the population. These can potentially serve as quasi-identifiers. It is worth noting, however, that not all of these extreme genes are associated with eQTLs. Section 4.8: On Modeling of Genotype-Phenotype Distribution for Genotype Prediction in Linking Attacks In the second step of the linking attack, the genotype predictions are performed. The genotype predictions are used, as an intermediate information, as input to the step 3 in Fig 3, where linking is performed. The main aim of attacker is to maximize the linking accuracy (not the genotype prediction accuracy), which depends jointly on the genotype prediction accuracy and the accuracy of the genotype matching in the 3rd step. Other than the accuracy of linking, another important consideration, for risk management purposes, is the amount of auxiliary input data (like training data for prediction model) that the genotype prediction takes. The prediction methods that require high amount of auxiliary data would decrease the accessibility of the linking attack as the attacker would need to gather extra information before performing the attack. On the other hand, the prediction methods that require little or no auxiliary data makes the linking attack much more realistic and prevalent. It is therefore useful, in the risk management strategies, to study complexities of genotype prediction methods and evaluate how these translate into assessing the accuracy and applicability of the linking attack. We study different simplifications of genotype prediction, and illustrate different levels of complexity for genotype prediction.  As we presented in Section 2.3, we assume that the attacker estimates the posterior distribution of genotypes and utilizes the maximum *a posteriori* estimate of the genotype as the general prediction method. For this, attacker must first model the joint genotype-phenotype distribution and then build the posterior genotype distribution. Figure S9a shows the joint genotype-expression distribution for an eQTL. Figure S9b shows the modeling of the joint distribution using 3 conditional distributions of expression levels at each genotype. First, the means and variances of the distributions are assumed independent. Assuming that mean and variance are sufficient statistics for the conditional distributions (e.g., normally distributed), the joint distributions can be modeled when the 6 parameters (3 means and 3 variances) are trained. The training can be performed using unsupervised methods like expectation maximization or can be performed using training data. This would, however, increase the required auxiliary data and decrease the applicability of the linking attack. Figure S9c shows a simplification of the model by assuming the variances of the conditional expression distributions are same for each genotype. This decreases the number of parameters to be trained to 4 (3 means and 1 variance). Figure S9d shows an equally complex model with 4 parameters where the conditional distributions are uniform at non-overlapping ranges of expression for each genotype. This model requires 4 parameters to be trained corresponding to the expression range limits. Figure S9e shows the final simplification of the genotype prediction, which requires only one parameter to be trained. In this model, the prediction only assigns uniform probability for homozygous genotypes when expression levels higher or lower than and assigns 0 conditional probability to the heterozygous genotypes, which brings up an important point: This simplified model is exactly the distribution that is utilized in the extremity based genotype prediction. In the extremity based prediction, we estimate simply as the mid-point of the range of gene expression levels within the expression dataset (Equations 3 and 4-6). Supplementary Material Section 1: Motivation on Extremity Attack: Outlier Attacks in Privacy Extremity is a central concept in privacy. This is because the individuals who are outliers in certain characteristics are statistically more distinguishable than other samples, which makes them more prone to be targeted by the privacy breaching attacks. A simple example follows: “If a person is driving a very expensive vehicle, it can be deduced with high certainty that he/she is wealthy”. It is worth noting that the reverse is not always true; i.e., a wealthy person can also drive a mid-range priced vehicle. Thus the extremity of the vehicle price enables us to estimate very roughly the economical status of a person. In formalisms like k-anonymization8, the aim is to protect published datasets by imposing statistical indistinguishability of the rare and extreme features using different methods like censoring, swapping, adding noise. In our study, the attacker uses extremity to evaluate the outlierness of the individuals’ phenotypes, then he/she predicts the genotypes and distinguishes them from other individuals. Since the extremity is simple to estimate from the data, the extremity based attack can be implemented easily, which makes it fairly applicable and realistic in most situations. |

### -- Ref3: The experimental validation needs to be improved.–--

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| Reviewer  Comment | a. The experimental validation needs to be improved. The authors tested their attacks on the GEUVADIS dataset. However this setting would produce optimistic results  as the model was learned and the tested was done on the same data. It would be more appropriate to split the data into a training and test set where the training set  is used to pick eQTLs and the test set is used for identification. |
| Author  Response | We agree with the reviewer that matching of eQTLs and testing dataset can create a bias. To address this issue, we have divided the GEUVADIS samples randomly in two sets (210, 211 individuals, respectively). One of the sets is used for identifying the eQTLs, using Matrix eQTL. The generated set of eQTLs are used in the second set for computing the characterization accuracy. This result is shown in Figure 6a. It can be seen that the characterization accuracy is slightly lower than the matching test/training sets but still very high.  We have updated the Results Section 2.4 of the manuscript to include these results. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Section 2.4: Individual Characterization using Extremity based Genotype Prediction The previous results show that extremity based linking attacks are highly effective when the eQTLs are identified and linking attack is performed using the same expression and genotype datasets. In order to assess the accuracy when the eQTLs are computed and tested on different datasets, we divided the dataset into a training and a testing dataset. The training dataset, of 210 individuals, is used to discover the eQTLs, using Matrix eQTL12 method (See Methods Section for details). The testing dataset, of 211 individuals, is utilized for assessing the accuracy of linking. Figure 6a shows the linking accuracy for individuals in testing dataset. The accuracy is very high, around 95%, which suggests that extremity based linking attacks are potentially effective when the datasets where eQTLs are identified do not match the data being tested. This is an important aspect of genotype prediction based linking attacks, as they exploit the generalizability of the correlations between phenotypes and genotypes. |

### -- Ref3: there are a number of biases that can reduce accuracy. --

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| Reviewer  Comment | b.In addition, there are a number of biases that can reduce accuracy. For example, if gene expression in the training and test sets were measured in different tissues,  platforms, populations. The manuscript currently does not address complications that are likely to arise in practice. I would have liked to see such a discussion as  well as empirical results that document the effects of these biases. |
| Author  Response | We agree with the reviewer that different biases can be introduced when the eQTLs are computed using datasets from different sources and technologies. To evaluate this, we focused on the population stratification, specified by the 1000 Genomes Project. We divided the samples into 5 populations. For each population, we identified the population specific eQTLs (using Matrix eQTL) then tested the matching accuracy on the expression values of other populations. Results are shown in Table S1a. We observed that for the 4 European populations (TSI, GBR, CEU, and FIN), the linking accuracies are generally very high (>95%), when the eQTL training population is different from testing population. When the eQTLs are trained on the African population, the accuracies drop significantly. This result can be attributed to the fact that the different genetic backgrounds can change the eQTL compositions in different populations, which decrease the power of extremity based genotype prediction, and decrease the individual matching accuracy. When the eQTL identification and testing data populations are close, however, the matching accuracy is significantly higher.  We also studied how the accuracy gets affected when eQTLs are identified in different tissues than the tested samples. For this, we used the eQTL database of GTex Project. We downloaded the eQTLs identified in 6 different tissues. We performed the matching against the genotypes of all the individuals in GEUVADIS dataset. The results are shown in Table S1b. It can be seen that the linking accuracy is still fairly high (>80% for all tissues except Skeleton eQTLs). As expected, we observed the highest accuracy for Whole Blood eQTLs. The decreased accuracy (compared to the matching tissues) can be attributed in part to the data processing and handling differences between the studies. These results show that the linking accuracy can still be fairly high when the eQTLs are identified in tissues that are not matching the tissues in which expression levels are measured.  We have updated the Results Section to include these results. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Results Section 2.4: Individual Characterization using Extremity based Genotype Prediction We also studied how the linking accuracy changes when the training and testing datasets are measured in different populations. For this, we used the 1000 Genomes Project sample information and divided the GEUVADIS samples into 5 populations. Then we used each population’s samples to discover the population specific eQTLs, then used the other populations to test the linking accuracy. Table S1a shows the accuracies in each case. It can be seen that when the eQTLs are disovered in European populations (CEU, GBR, TSI, FIN), the linking accuracies are very high (higher than 95%). When the eQTLs are discovered in YRI (African) population, the linking accuracies are smaller in European populations. Similarly, when eQTLs are discovered on European populations, the linking accuracy in YRI sample is relatively smaller. These results illustrate that extremity attack can still be effective when eQTLs are identified in populations that are genetically close to the population(s) of testing sample and decrease when the discovery and testing populations are diversified. We next studied scenario where the eQTLs are identified in tissues that are different from the tissues on which the expression data is generated. For this, we used the eQTLs that are identified by GTex Project41. We downloaded the eQTLs for 6 tissues and performed the linking attack on the whole GEUVADIS samples as test samples. The results are shown in Table S1b. The accuracy is highest for Whole Blood eQTLs, which is 88%. This is expected since the expression levels in GEUVADIS project are measured in blood cell lines. The accuracy is smallest for Muscle Skeletal eQTLs, which is 76%. It is worth noting that the decrease in the accuracies stem also from the differences in data handling and processing between GEUVADIS and GTex projects. |

### -- Ref3: It would also be interesting to understand how these attacks scale with data set size.–--

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| Reviewer  Comment | c. It would also be interesting to understand how these attacks scale with data set size. For example, how feasible is this attack within a dataset of 100,000  genotypes that are now being generated. Another interesting question is whether the method can discriminate close relatives that are likely to be present in large datasets. |
| Author  Response | We agree that these are important points for illustrating the general applicability of the extremity attack. To evaluate how the matching genotype sample size affects the accuracy, we simulated 100,000 individuals using the 1000 Genomes genotype frequencies for the eQTL SNPs. The eQTLs are identified from the training set of 210 individuals. The 100k simulated individual genotypes are then merged with the 211 testing sample set to generate the 100,211 individual sample set. We then used the expression levels (from GEUVADIS dataset) for the test sample and performed the extremity based attack on this larger dataset to check the characterizability of individuals in testing set. We observed that the matching accuracy is very high, around 96% (Figure 7a). This result indicates that extremity attack can potentially be effective in very large sample sizes.  In order to evaluate how the existence of close relatives affect linking accuracy, we focused on the genotype and expression data for 30 CEU trios (father, mother, child) in the HAPMAP project. We identified the eQTLs using all the individuals and then performed extremity based linking attack. Although the linking accuracy is very high, we wanted to evaluate how the close relatives were scored in the linkings. Thus, we computed the ranks of close relatives (child-mother, child-father linkings) in the linking process (excluding self ranks) and compared those to the ranks of randomly selected individuals in the dataset. The distribution of ranks are plotted in Fig. 8. It can be seen that the rank distribution of the close relatives is significantly shifted towards smaller ranks; which indicates that the linking assigns smaller ranks to the close relatives.  This result has a significant consequence: Even when the individual that the attacker aiming to link is not in the genotype dataset, the attacker may still be able to link him/her to a close relatives that may be in the dataset, which would identify the family of the individual and cause a privacy concern.  We updated the Results Section with the above results. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Results Section 2.4: Individual Characterization using Extremity based Genotype Prediction An important practical question is how well the linking accuracy changes with increasing genotype data size. In order to evaluate this, we simulated the genotypes of the eQTLs (discovered in the training set) for 100,000 individuals. The 100,000 simulated individuals are then merged with the testing dataset of 211 individuals to build the large testing dataset. We then performed the extremity attack using the expression levels of the testing dataset and linked them to the merged testing dataset of size 100,211 individuals. The linking accuracy is plotted in Fig 7a with changing eQTL selection criteria. The linking accuracy is very high (Around 96%). This result suggests that the extremity attack can be extended to a large testing sample set. Figure 7b shows the sensitivity versus PPV (with changing first gap distance) for the eQTLs for which the overall linking accuracy is 70% (Yellow dashed lines on Fig. 7b). It can be seen that the attacker can link around 55% of the individuals with PPV higher than 95%. Only the remaining 15% are predicted with accuracy lower than 95%.  …  We also studied whether having close relatives in the genotype dataset affects the accuracy. To test this, we used the expression and genotype data from 30 CEU trios (mother-father-child) from available from HAPMAP project14,15. We first identified the eQTLs from the 90 individuals and performed linking over the same individuals. We then computed the average rank of the (non-self) close relatives in each linking. For example, when the tested individual is a father or mother, we computed the rank of the individual child and if the tested individual is a child, we computed the rank of his/her mother and father. We also selected, for each tested individual, a random individual and computed his/her rank in the linking. The distribution of the ranks are shown in Fig 8. It can be seen that the ranks of the related individuals are significantly shifted to smaller values compared to random individuals. This result shows that the close relatives can get linked to each other. This result indicates that the individuals that are close relatives may potentially be confused with each other. While the correct person may not get characterized, the attacker can still reveal sensitive information about the individual’s family, which might extend the reach of privacy breach and cause privacy concerns for the family. |

### -- Ref3: For a realistic attack, the attacker would need some threshold on the distance function to decide if a test individual is linked to a given predicted genotype. How should this threshold be chosen ?–--

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| Reviewer  Comment | d. The authors declare an individual to be vulnerable if pred\_j = j. This is only a first step in documenting its utility. For a realistic attack, the attacker would  need some threshold on the distance function to decide if a test individual is linked to a given predicted genotype. How should this threshold be chosen ? Does it  give adequate power at a low false positive rate i.e. very few unrelated individuals fall below the threshold while the correct individual does ? |
| Author  Response | The reviewer raises an important point. If the attacker can find a way to measure the reliability of the matchings he/she performed, he/she can focus on those individuals for which the linking has high reliability and increase his/her chance of a breach at the cost of a decrease in the sensitivity of matching. For this, the attacker also has to use only the information that is available to him/her, i.e., he/she cannot use the correct genotypes.  We found that, for each linking, “genotype distance difference between best and second best matching individuals” (*first distance gap*) serves as a good measure, that the attacker can compute for each linking, to estimate the accuracy of the linkings. (See Methods Section, Figure S5) This measure stems from the observation that when the linking is incorrect, sorted distances at top are much closer to each other compared to the ones when the linking is correct.  In order to evaluate this measure’s effectiveness, we evaluated the matchings when the whole eQTL list from training sample is considered. Among the 86% that is correctly identified, we are evaluating whether the ranking with respect to distance difference places the correct matchings to the top. We computed the distance difference for all the matchings that the attacker does, and sorted the matchings with respect to the difference. Finally, we computed the positive predictive value and the sensitivity over increasing distance difference cutoff values, which is plotted in Fig. 6b. Compared to random rankings of the matchings (which uniformly have 86% PPV), this sorting provides much higher PPV. In addition, upto 79% of the individuals can be linked correctly with more than 95% PPV. These results illustrate that the attacker can rank the matchings using the proposed *first distance gap* difference and select the ones that have high genotype distance to focus the attack on highly reliable linkings.  We updated the Methods Section to introduce first distance gap measure in detail and updated the Results Section 2.4 with the above results. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Results Section 2.4: Individual Characterization using Extremity based Genotype Prediction We evaluated whether the attacker can estimate the reliability of the linkings. This may potentially increase the effectiveness of the linking and increase the risk associated with linking attacks because the attacker can estimate reliability of the linkings and choose the ones that are more likely to be correct. This increases the risk associated with the linking attacks because although he/she may not have a high overall accuracy of linkings, the high ranking linkings may be much higher in accuracy. We observed that the measure we termed, *first distance gap*, denoted by (See Methods), serves as a good reliability estimate for each linking. For a given linking, is the difference between the genotype distances of the 1st closest and 2nd closest individuals to the predicted genotypes. When the linking is incorrect, we observed that is very likely to be smaller than the distance difference when the linking is correct.  To evaluate this measure further, we computed the positive predictive value (PPV) versus sensitivity of the linkings of individuals in the testing set with changing threshold. For this, we first computed for each linking, then filtered the linkings that did not satisfy the threshold. Then we computed PPV and sensitivity of the linkings (See Methods), which is plotted in Fig 6b. It can be seen that the PPV of linkings can get very high at the same time with high sensitivity. For example, the attacker can link around 79% of the individuals at a PPV higher than 95%. The random sorting of the linkings, on the other hand, have significantly lower PPV (cyan in the plots) at the same sensitivity levels. These results suggest that the attacker can increase the potential risk (accuracy of linkings) of the attack by focusing on a slightly smaller set of linkings with high reliability. Methods Section 4.6: First Distance Gap Statistic For Linking Reliability Estimation Following the previous section, the attacker computes, for each individual, the distance to all the genotypes in genotype dataset, then identifies the individual with smallest distance. Let and denote the minimum and second minimum genotype distances (among for all ***a***) for jth individual. We propose using the difference between these distances as a measure of reliability of linking. For this, the attacker computes following difference:   |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | |  |  | (23) |   First distance gap can be computed without the knowledge of the true genotypes, and is immediately accessible by the attacker with no need for auxiliary information. The basic motivation for this statistic comes from the observation that the first distance gap for correctly linked individuals are much higher compared to the incorrectly linked individuals. |

### -- Ref3: The presentation could be clarified to highlight the main contributions. –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | 3. The presentation could be clarified to highlight the main contributions.  a. For example, it is unclear how section 2.2 relates to the rest of the paper. While it is interesting to see the relationship between predictability and leakage,  this result does not seem to be used later. The choice of eQTLs is done simply using the correlation.  b. Similarly, I would have liked to see a better motivation of extremity-based prediction (which I consider to be the most interesting part of the paper) and a better  experimental validation. |
| Author  Response | We agree with the reviewer’s concern. As we explained above, we have made updates the results Section 2.2 to clarify how Section 2.2 relates to the other sections. In summary, the quantification methodology that is presented in Section 2.2 evaluates, for a given list of eQTLs, how much information leakage is expected at different levels of predictability. This way, the data releasing mechanisms can quantify the risks associated with releasing the QTL datasets. The following sections 2.3 and 2.4 focus on how the genotype-phenotype linkages can be made. We have added Supplementary Figure S8 that illustrates how the different sections in the manuscript can be utilized in general in a risk assessment procedure. In addition, we added Figures S5, S6, and S7 that serve to clarify several general aspects of how the scenario that we are presenting, the technical details of linking attack, and also a specific example of how extremity of phenotypes are utilized in a linking attack.  We also included a number of experimental validations in the Results Section. We believe these updates clarify how different Sections fit with each other in the manuscript and concretize the experimental validations. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Section 2.2: Quantification of Tradeoff between Correct Predictability of Genotypes and Leakage of Individual Characterizing Information The presented quantification procedure can be utilized for evaluating the risk of information leakage while releasing QTL datasets. For example, the QTLs to be released can be assessed in terms of the characterizing information leakage versus the predictability so as to estimate the size and risk of a linking attack (Fig S8) that would be mediated by these QTLs. Supplementary Material Section 1: Motivation on Extremity Attack: Outlier Attacks in Privacy Extremity is a central concept in privacy. This is because the individuals who are outliers in certain characteristics are statistically more distinguishable than other samples, which makes them more prone to be targeted by the privacy breaching attacks. A simple example follows: “If a person is driving a very expensive vehicle, it can be deduced with high certainty that he/she is wealthy”. It is worth noting that the reverse is not always true; i.e., a wealthy person can also drive a mid-range priced vehicle. Thus the extremity of the vehicle price enables us to estimate very roughly the economical status of a person. In formalisms like k-anonymization1, the aim is to protect published datasets by imposing statistical indistinguishability of the rare and extreme features using different methods like censoring, swapping, adding noise. In our study, the attacker uses extremity to evaluate the outlierness of the individuals’ phenotypes, then he/she predicts the genotypes and distinguishes them from other individuals. Since the extremity is simple to estimate from the data, the extremity based attack can be implemented easily, which makes it fairly applicable and realistic in most situations. Supplementary Material Section 5: A Basic Risk Assessment Procedure for Genotype-Phenotype and QTL Datasets Figure S8 illustrates a risk assessment procedure that puts together different parts of our study. The analysis of tradeoff between ICI leakage and predictability (Section 2.2, top path in Fig S8) can be utilized for evaluating the risks associated with releasing QTL datasets. For a newly identified set of QTLs, the data releasers can compute the average information leakage and the corresponding levels of predictability to estimate the number of individuals that are potentially vulnerable at different levels of predictability. The predictabilities can be estimated using the conditional entropies in the QTL detection datasets, and the ICI leakage can be estimated using the genotype frequencies from the population panels. Secondly, the risks associated with releasing matching genotype and phenotype datasets can be evaluated using the 3-step linking attack frameworks. For this, the vulnerable individuals are identified. Finally a risk assessment can be performed to ensure that the vulnerable individuals are protected. |

### -- Ref3: Typos –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | Typos:  Page 2: "GTex project hosts a sizable set of eQTL dataset"  Page 4: "the all the predicted genotypes" |
| Author  Response | We sincerely thank the reviewer for very careful reading of our manuscript. We have fixed the typos pointed out by the reviewer. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Page 4: … For example, GTex Project hosts a sizable set of eQTL dataset from multiple studies where the users can view in detail how the genotypes and expression levels are associated 13,16… Page 5: … Thus, each time he/she predicts a new genotype, he/she will encounter a tradeoff between the number of genotypes that can be predicted correctly versus the cumulative correctness of all the predicted genotypes… |

### -- Ref4: Remarks to the Author –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | The authors present a rigorous and important analysis of how predictive are genotype-phenotype correlations, using an expression quantitative trait loci (eQTL)  dataset as an example. Their method predicts genotypes from eQTL gene expression with high accuracy, addressing privacy concerns related to genetic data  identifiability. Despite their important contribution to addressing this problematic issue, I have some concerns and questions about this manuscript that preclude me  from giving it my strongest support. |
| Author  Response | We thank the reviewer for careful assessment and consideration of our manuscript. We address each comment below. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript |  |

### -- Ref4: Major Critique: the authors do not compare the performance of their method with this previous one. This should be done –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | The authors rightfully cite a previous publication (Schadt et al, Nature Genetics 2012) that relates to their study, as they also developed a method to predict  genotypes from eQTL gene expression. Nevertheless, the authors do not compare the performance of their method with this previous one. This should be done, as to  assess the importance of this new method with the current state-of-the-art tools addressing the same issue. |
| Author  Response | We understand that the reviewer recommends this comparison between the methods. It is first necessary to note that both methods perform linking attacks, so the genotype predictions are performed as middle steps. In fact the source code that we received from the Schadt et al does not give as output the genotype predictions. We therefore compared the linking accuracies of the two methods. For comparison, we divided the GEUVADIS dataset into 3 sets: First set is used for identifying eQTLs (85 individuals). Second set is used for training Schadt et al method (85 individuals) and the final set is used (174 individuals) for performing the linking attack and comparing the accuracies. We utilized the 1000 top eQTLs identified on the training dataset. Extremity based linking takes as input the eQTLs and the testing expression dataset. Schadt et al method takes as input the training set (expression and genotypes) and the testing expression dataset. The linking accuracies are shown in Table S2. It can be seen that both methods perform with very high accuracy. These results show that our approach performs comparably at high accuracy as the approach proposed by Schadt et al.  As the amount of data that is required is not the same while testing two methods, we also compared the amount of input that each method requires to gain the reported linking accuracies. Our method takes, for each eQTL only 1 parameter, which is the correlation coefficient. Schadt et al method, on the other hand, takes as input a training dataset (expressions and genotypes) to build the prediction model. We changed the training data size and evaluated the linking accuracy of Schadt et al’s method (Results in Table S2). It can be seen when the training data size is at 30 data points per eQTL, the accuracy of Schadt et al is almost comparable to extremity based attack. This result illustrates the difference in the required data size for both methods. Our extremity attack requires almost 30 times less data compared to Schadt et al method, which highlights the practical applicability of the extremity attack on a dataset.  We would like to emphasize that these comparison results should be interpreted with caution. Our aim in this comparison is to show that the extremity attack has comparable accuracy to the training based attack. When the data is to be published or served, these attacks must be considered altogether (rather than choosing the best performing one) since they represent different paths to a privacy breach.  We added the Supplementary Section 3 to report the Comparison Results. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | *Supplementary Section 3: Comparison of Extremity based Linking Attack Accuracy with Linking Attack in Schadt et al* It is worth comparing the accuracies of extremity attack and the attack proposed in Schadt et al11. This attack takes as input a training set comprising the expression and genotype dataset and the list of eQTLs. Using the training set and eQTLs, it trains a genotype prediction model, which is then used for in the linking attack. On the other hand, extremity attack takes only the list of eQTLs. In order to compare the linking accuracies, we first divided the GEUVADIS dataset into 3 sets: First set is used for identifying eQTLs (85 individuals). Second set is used for training Schadt et al method (85 individuals) and the final set is used (174 individuals) for performing the linking attack and comparing the accuracies. We utilized the 1000 top eQTLs identified on the training dataset, as used in Schadt et al study11. Extremity based linking takes as input the eQTLs and the testing expression dataset. Schadt et al method takes as input the training set (expression and genotypes) and the testing expression dataset. The linking accuracies are shown in Table S2. It can be seen that both methods perform with very high accuracy. These results show that our approach performs comparably at high accuracy as the approach proposed by Schadt et al.  As the amount of data that is required is not the same while testing two methods, we also compared the amount of input that each method requires to gain the reported linking accuracies. Our method takes, for each eQTL only 1 parameter, which is the correlation coefficient. Schadt et al method, on the other hand, takes as input a training dataset (expressions and genotypes) to build the prediction model. We changed the training data size and evaluated the linking accuracy (Results in Table S2). It can be seen when the training data size is at 30 data points per eQTL, the accuracy of Schadt et al is almost comparable to extremity based attack. This result illustrates the difference in the required data size for both methods. Extremity attack requires 20 to 30 times less data compared to Schadt et al method, which highlight the practical applicability of the extremity attack on a dataset. |

### -- Ref4: the authors do not mention which was their p-value threshold. At least FDR<5% should be used. –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | The authors use the reported eQTL correlation coefficient as the criteria for strength of the eQTL association. Nevertheless, the authors do not mention which was  their p-value threshold. At least FDR<5% should be used. One of the problems of using only the correlation coefficient is that for instance for rare SNPs, the  correlation coefficient might be extremely high but the p-value can be borderline significant. |
| Author  Response | We agree with the reviewer’s rightful concern. There are several eQTL datasets that we used: For eQTLs obtained from GEUVADIS project, we made sure to use FDR<5% eQTLs, which are located under project data files. For the eQTL datasets that are identified via training datasets using Matrix eQTL method, we used only the expression-genotype pairs for which Matrix eQTL reports at most 5% FDR, which is computed via Benjamini-Hochberg methodology.  We have updated the Methods Section in detail to explain how eQTL selection was performed. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Methods Section 4.7: eQTL Identification on Training Sets with Matrix eQTL For identification of eQTLs, we used Matrix eQTL12 method. We first generated the testing and training sample lists by randomly picking 210 and 211 individuals, respectively, for testing and training sets. We then separated the genotype and expression matrices into training and testing sets. In order to decrease the run time, Matrix eQTL is run in cis-eQTL identification mode. After the eQTLs are generated, we filtered out the eQTLs whose FDR was larger than 5%. We finally removed the redundancy by ensuring that each gene and each SNP is used only once in the eQTL final list.  ***Methods Section 5: Datasets***  The normalized gene expression levels for 462 individuals and the eQTL dataset are obtained from gEUVADIS mRNA sequencing project17. The eQTL dataset contains all the significant (At most 5% false discovery rate cutoff) gene-variant pairs with high genotype-expression correlation. To ensure that there are no dependencies between the variant genotypes and expression levels, we used the eQTL entries where gene and variants are unique. In other words, each variant and gene are found exactly once in the final eQTL dataset. The genotype, gender, and population information datasets for 1092 individuals are obtained from 1000 Genomes Project 18. For 421 individuals, both the genotype data and gene expression levels are available. |

### -- Ref4: why does the genotype accuracy decreases when the absolute correlation threshold is bigger than ~ 0.7? –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | In Figure 5b, why does the genotype accuracy decreases when the absolute correlation threshold is bigger than ~ 0.7? |
| Author  Response | The reviewer is raising a good point. The problem is with the accuracy computation: At the high absolute correlation threshold, there are very small number of SNPs (Figure 4a). This makes the genotype accuracy (the fraction) unstable. Although we expect very high accuracy, 1 wrong prediction out of a small number in the fraction pulls accuracy down significantly. The decrease at 0.7 threshold is reflecting this behavior. We updated the Results Section to include a clarification for this behavior. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Results Section 2.4: The slight decrease of genotype accuracy at correlation thresholds higher than 0.7 is caused by the fact that the accuracy (fraction of correct genotype predictions within all genotypes) is not robust at very small number of SNPs. Although we expect very high accuracy, even one wrong prediction among small number of total genotypes decreases the accuracy significantly. |

### -- Ref4: It is not clear if your tool available at http://privaseq.gersteinlab.org can use the "Extremity based Genotype Prediction" –--

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| Reviewer  Comment | It is not clear if your tool available at http://privaseq.gersteinlab.org can use the "Extremity based Genotype Prediction". Please clarify in a README file. |
| Author  Response | The reviewer is bringing up an interesting question about whether the tool supplies the predicted genotypes with extremity based linking. The genotypes predictions are used by our tool to perform compute the genotype distances and perform linking. They are, thus, only intermediate data that is used by the tool, so we do not supply the extremity based genotype predictions.  The output from the tool is one tab delimited file that contains vulnerability information for each sample. In each row, there are 4 columns that correspond to following:  …  whether each individual is vulnerable and also the first distance gap statistic corresponding to the individual’s linking.  We updated the README file to clarify these. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript |  |

### -- Ref4: can your tool address this by being able to use imputed genotypes?–--

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| Reviewer  Comment | Since a lot of new studies have published eQTL datasets based on imputed genotypes, can your tool address this by being able to use imputed genotypes? |
| Author  Response | The reviewer is raising an important point. In principle, the SNP genotypes that are identified via imputation are not any different from genotyped SNPs in terms of characterizing information content they provide, so our tool should be able to handle them properly. One important point, however, is that the SNPs that are in linkage disequilibrium blocks tend to be very highly correlated and not give any information. In fact addition of these may increase redundancy and add noise to linking process and decrease linking accuracy. This is why we remove all the redundancies in genes and SNPs, i.e., each SNP and gene are used once in the linking attack. One could, however, evaluate the dependencies between genotypes and build a more complicated model of genotype prediction (step 2) and also include this information in linking (step 3) so as to reach a higher accuracy.  We have added a paragraph of these points in the Discussion Section. |
| Excerpt From  Revised Manuscript | Supplemantary Section 4: Imputed Genotypes and Linking Attacks Many studies use imputed genotypes in building genotype datasets. One practical question is how the imputed genotypes effect the linking accuracy. In principle, the SNP genotypes that are identified via imputation are not any different from genotyped SNPs in terms of characterizing information content they provide, so our tool should be able to handle them properly. One important point, however, is that the SNPs that are in linkage disequilibrium blocks tend to be very highly correlated and not give any information. In fact addition of these may increase redundancy and add noise to linking process and decrease linking accuracy. This is why we remove all the redundancies in genes and SNPs, i.e., each SNP and gene are used once in the linking attack. One could, however, evaluate the dependencies between genotypes and build a more complicated model of genotype prediction (step 2) and also include this information in linking (step 3) so as to reach a higher accuracy. |

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