

Analysis of Individual Characterizing Information Leakage in Gene Expression and Genotype Datasets

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ABSTRACT

~~The Genomic privacy is gaining much attention with the unprecedented increase in the breadth and depth of personal “-omic” datasets enforces the data sharing mechanisms to adapt to. While most of the risks associated with leakage studies are focused on protection of genomic variants in personal genomes, the analysis of sensitive personal medical information. The genome-wide studies on association between the genetic variants and the leakage in molecular phenotypic profiling data have identified correlations datasets, like functional genomics datasets, is in its inception. A significant amount of leakage can be caused by the phenotype-to-genotype correlations identified by the genome-wide studies, where associations between large number of genetic loci and different molecular phenotypes are discovered. Although these correlations are valuable for biological understanding of how phenotype and genotype interacts, they can serve to interact an adversary as a backdoor can utilize the phenotype-to-genotype correlations for predicting the variant genotypes from phenotypes or vice-versa for the individuals, for which only phenotype information is available. When the prediction is done performed over very a large number of genetic loci, this allows predicted genotypes the adversary to can accurately link the entries in genotype and phenotype datasets so as to the entries in a genotype dataset to reveal sensitive phenotypic information about individuals. Even though majority the genomic privacy studies has focused solely on protection of genetic variants, it is necessary to analyze how these correlations can lead to a linking attack with other datasets and lead to privacy breach information.~~

In this paper, we study the characterizability of individuals in the context of linking attacks, where an adversary aims at revealing an individual’s sensitive information by ~~matching, or linking,~~ the entries in phenotype and genotype datasets. While doing this the attacker utilizes a third dataset that contains the ~~genotype to-phenotype-to-genotype~~ correlations. We focus on the correlations between genotypes and gene expression levels reported in eQTL datasets. We first ~~perform a quantitative analysis quantitatively assess the relation~~ between the amount of information leakage ~~the adversary can cause by genotype prediction~~ and ~~the correct predictability of the genotypes show accurately the leakage can be performed.~~ We propose two quantification metrics that can be used for evaluating the amount of leakage at different levels of ~~prediction-correct predictability.~~ We then present a ~~generalized general~~ framework for analysis of the individual characterization and evaluate the fraction of characterizable individuals in a general setting on the representative dataset. For ~~a~~ illustrating the practicality of these analyses, we present a simple practical genotype prediction method, which, when employed on a representative dataset, yields a significant fraction of individuals characterizable. Overall, the quantification metrics and

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the analysis framework can be utilized ~~to~~in analysis of individual characterizability in other ~~genotype-to-studies~~ where phenotype ~~correlation studies to-genotype~~ correlations are investigated.